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Essays 
Affrrmative Action After Reagan 
Neal Devins* 
Ronald Reagan assumed office at the apparent height of the affirma-
tive action controversy. During the Carter years, the Supreme Court 
wrote for the first time about the legality of both public- and private-
sector affirmative action. Although these opinions generally approved of 
affirmative action, they sent confusing messages: Congress can remedy 
proven societal discrimination through a modest set aside; 1 a public uni-
versity cannot remedy societal discrimination through admissions, 
although race can be a factor in admissions decisions;2 Title VII nondis-
crimination requirements do not apply to certain types of private-sector 
affirmative action. 3 These rulings were more than ambiguous; they re-
vealed a fractured court. The Justices filed multiple opinions and bitter 
dissents in each case. Rather than quieting the affirmative action debate, 
these rulings exacerbated the controversy.4 Consequently, despite three 
landmark opinions, the fate of affirmative action remained unsettled. 
The Carter Administration was a strong advocate in these cases, ar-
guing that affirmative action was as laudable as it was necessary. 5 In 
addition, this Administration pressed affirmative action by enacting reg-
ulations governing civil service hiring and federal contracting and by es-
tablishing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) guidelines. 6 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. 
The author would like to thank Tad Pethybridge for his exceptional assistance in the preparation of 
this Essay. 
1. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (upholding a congressional spending 
program requiring ten percent of federal funds granted for local public works projects to be used to 
procure services or supplies from minority-owned businesses). 
2. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978). 
3. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207 (1979). 
4. When the Court wants to quiet the controversy about a divisive issue, it takes steps to speak 
in a unanimous voice. In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 433 (1954), for example, the 
Justices made numerous compromises to ensure that the Court's opinion would be unanimous. See 
Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 
GEO. L.J. I, I (1979); Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. PoL. 689, 690 (1971). 
5. See Brief for Secretary of Commerce at 14, Fullilove (No. 78-1007); Brief for United States 
at 16, Weber (No. 78-432); Brief for United States at 6, Bakke (No. 76-811). 
6. See, e.g., Clark, Affirmative Action May Fall Victim to Reagan's Regulatory Reform Drive, 
353 
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In 1980, presidential candidate Reagan challenged the Carter af-
firmative action initiatives. Whereas the 1980 Democratic platform as-
serted that "[a]n effective affirmative action program is an essential 
component of our commitment to expanding civil rights protections,"7 
the Republican platform argued that "equal opportunity should not be 
jeopardized by bureaucratic regulations and decisions which rely on quo-
tas, ratios, and numerical requirements to exclude some individuals in 
favor of others, thereby rendering such regulations and decisions inher-
ently discriminatory."8 
Once in office, however, the Reagan Administration's pursuit of its 
equal opportunity platform proved far from clear. The Administration 
opposed the Civil Rights Restoration Act,9 proposals for changes in vot-
ing rights, 10 and amendments to fair-housing legislationll-positions 
that evidenced lts lack of support for stronger civil rights enforcement.12 
13 NAT'L J. 1248, 1249-52 (1981) (noting that during the Carter Administration, regulations were 
passed barring employers from terminating workers on disability leaves for pregnancy as well as 
requiring extra minority recruitment efforts to be expended by agencies with few minorities or wo-
men); Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 
488-97 (noting that during the Carter Administration the IRS proposed a change in the tax laws to 
deny tax-exempt status to private schools with "insignificant" numbers of minority students); Finn, 
"Affirmative Action" Under Reagan, COMMENTARY, Apr. 1982, at 17, 18-20 (reporting that the 
Carter Administration imposed on the federal government a strict quota system for hiring 
minorities). 
7. 1980 Democratic Platform, reprinted in D. JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 
!840-1976, at 60 (Supp. 1980). 
8. 1980 Republican Platform, reprinted in D. JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 182. 
9. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1687). This 
legislation was designed to nullify the Supreme Court's determination that federal civil rights legisla-
tion extends only to the direct recipient of federal funds and not to the entire institution of which 
that recipient is a part. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 571 (1984). President Reagan 
vetoed this legislation, claiming that it would "vastly and unjustifiably expand the power of the 
Federal government over the decisions and affairs of private organizations." Message to the Senate 
on Civil Rights Legislation, 24 WEEKLY CaMP. PRES. Doc. 353, 353 (Mar. 16, 1988). Congress 
overrode this veto. See 134 CoNG. REc. Hl072, S2765 (daily ed. March 22, 1988). 
10. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). To ease plaintiffs' burden, Congress amended the 1965 
Voting Rights Act to make disparate racial impact probative of discriminatory motivation. The 
Administration initially opposed the bill, claiming that it would "likely lead to the widespread re-
structuring by Federal courts of electoral procedures and systems." SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITU-
TION, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON VOTING RIGHTS ACT 39 (Comm. Print 1982) (quoting 
testimony of William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights); see also 
Pear, Reagan Backs Voting Rights Act but Wants to Ease Requirements, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1981, 
at AI, col. 3 (noting Reagan's opposition to a simple effects test to prove discrimination). After 
substantial pressure from the Republican leadership of Congress, Reagan endorsed voting rights 
amendments that made some use of evidence of bad effects. See Remarks on Signing the Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, PUB. PAPERS 822-23 (June 29, 1982). 
II. See Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (to 
be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3617). Indeed, during the signing ceremony, President Reagan 
expressed dissatisfaction with effects-based tests of fair housing violations and emphasized that fair 
housing laws speak "only to intentional discrimination." Remarks on Signing the Fair Housing 
Amendments Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1140, 1141 (Sept. 13, 1988). 
12. The Administration's initiative to restore the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory 
354 
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At the same time, however, the Administration left in place several of its 
predecessor's most controversial programs and policies. For example, 
the "Reagan Revolution" did not bring with it changes in Executive Or-
der 11,246, which requires affirmative action by government contrac-
tors. 13 The Administration, moreover, did not alter either Small 
Business Administration and other Executive-initiated set-aside pro-
gramsi4 or EEOC guidelines providing for an inference of adverse impact 
whenever the "utilization" of women and minorities is less than eighty 
percent of their "availability."I5 
In sharp contrast to this regulatory inaction, I6 the Reagan Justice 
Department quickly took steps to limit race-conscious affirmative action. 
As Civil Rights Division head William Bradford Reynolds testified in 
1981: 
We no longer will insist upon or in any respect support the use of 
quotas or any other numerical or statistical formula designed to 
provide to nonvictims of discrimination preferential treatment .... 
. . . Separate treatment of people in the field of ~mployment, 
based on nothing more than personal characteristics of race or gen-
der, is as offensive to standards of human decency today as it was 
private schools also raised doubts about its commitment to antidiscrimination principles. See 
Devins, supra note 6, at 494-95. For a comprehensive, critical review of Reagan-era civil rights 
policy, seeN. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 32-163 (1988). 
13. See Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e app. at 28 (1982). The Reagan Administmtion did consider eliminating this contract com-
pliance progmm. After the Supreme Court ruled in 1986 that affirmative action could serve as 
appropriate compensation for past discrimination, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 
274 (1986), however, the Administration decided not to change contract compliance requirements. 
See Boyd, Goals for Hiring to Stay in Place, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1986, at A1, col. 5. 
14. See generally Levinson, A Study of Preferential Treatment: The Evolution of Minority Busi-
ness Enterprise Assistance Programs, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 61, 64-98 (1980) (discussing the his-
tory and effectiveness of various Minority Business Enterprise set-aside programs). The Reagan 
Administration, surprisingly, was a vocal supporter of federal minority set-aside programs. See 
Pear, Administration Challenges Plan by Rights Panel, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1986, at A1, col. 2. 
15. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (1988). 
16. I use inaction rather than acquiescence because the Administration seriously considered 
changing several of these programs. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text. Conservatives 
severely criticized the Administration for its failure to develop a comprehensive approach to affirma-
tive action. As Chester E. Finn, Jr. remarked: 
Whither civil rights under Ronald Reagan? As with foreign affairs, it seems to depend 
more than it shonld on what day it is, who is in charge of a particular decision, what 
constituency is raising the loudest ruckus, and which agency is responsible for formulating 
the alternatives and executing the decision. The most ideological administration in recent 
history seems not to have its ideas sorted out .... 
Finn, supra note 6, at 28. The civil rights community saw things much differently. See, e.g., N. 
AMAKER, supra note 12, at 157 (remarking that the Bork nomination was opposed by civil rights 
advocates who had witnessed an "assault on affirmative action remedies" during the Reagan Admin-
istmtion). CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO OPEN THE DOORS OF 
JoB OPPORTUNITY 90-120 (1984) (assailing the weakening of affirmative action enforcement by vari-
ous executive departments and agencies). 
355 
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some 84 years ago when countenanced under Plessy v. Ferguson 
17 
With the close of the 1988 Supreme Court Term, it is now possible to 
assess the Reagan Administration's success in advancing its absolutist 
goals of "color blindness" through the courts. 
The assessment is a mixed story. Of greatest significance, Reagan 
Administration efforts to entirely discredit race and sex preferences have 
clearly failed. Over the past few years, the Court has validated a range of 
hiring and promotion schemes that benefit nonvictims.18 At the same 
time, however, the Court has barred nonremedial set asides and layoffs of 
senior nonminority employees.19 
Because of the contentiousness and symbolic importance of affirma-
tive action, the Court's jurisprudence on this issue does not lend itself to 
blanket generalizations. Indeed, as Justice Jackson commented in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,2° "court decisions are indecisive 
because of the judicial practice of dealing with the largest questions in 
the most nar:row way."21 Judicial patchwork then is the norm, and af-
firmative action is no exception. 
Nonetheless, headlines like "Court Affirmative Action Decision 
Says Little" or "Court Both Clarifies and Confuses Its Position on Af-
firmative Action" make poor copy.22 Not surprisingly, the popular and 
academic press generally view each affirmative action opinion to be of 
great historical moment. A comparison of the media's treatment of the 
17. Oversight Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action, 1981: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. I, at 134, 137 (1981) (statement of William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attor-
ney General for Civil Rights); see also Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of 
Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995, 998-1001 (1984) (advocating race neutrality over racial preferences as a 
more effective means of protecting individual rights). 
18. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641-42 (1987) (approving prefer-
ence for minority and women employees seeking promotion); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 
149, 166-67 (1987) (holding that the Constitution does not absolutely prohibit court-ordered race-
conscious relief); Local No. 93, Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501,530 
(1986) (approving entry of consent decree providing temporary race-conscious hiring and promo-
tion); Loca128 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,453 (1986) (holding 
that Title VII does not absolutely prohibit court-ordered, race-conscious relief). 
19. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 729 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion) (holding that race-conscious set asides must be based on particularized discrimination and must 
be narrowly tailored); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (holding that 
remedying societal discrimination cannot justify granting preferences under the Constitution); 
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 575 (1984) (holding that nonvictim relief 
cannot disrupt seniority rights under Title VII). 
20. 343 u.s. 579 (1952). 
21. /d. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
22. Cf. Greenhouse, Bias Remedy vs. Seniority, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1984, at A17, col. I ("In 
case after case over the last decade, the Supreme Court has walked gingerly through the minefield of 
affirmative action, always emerging with some questions answered and many more left for another 
day."). 
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final two Reagan-era decisions, Johnson v. Transportation Agency23 and 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 24 illuminate this phenomenon. 
The Supreme Court held in Johnson that a county agency could pro-
mote a female over a marginally better qualified male to help alleviate sex 
imbalance in a job category. Most observers believed that the case had 
largely settled the thorny question of the permissibility of affirmative ac-
tion programs. Press reaction was quick and unanimous. Although me-
dia accounts took varying editorial positions on the wisdom of the 
decision, the accounts invariably portrayed the decision as extremely im-
portant and far reaching. United Press International, the Los Angeles 
Times, and Reuters, for example, all described the decision as either 
"landmark" or "historic."25 Two major newspapers went even further in 
their characterizations: the Washington Post called the decision the 
Court's "broadest endorsement yet of affirmative action programs,"26 
and the New York Times called it the "most sweeping endorsement ever 
of special preferences."27 
Such ringing pronouncements were not confined to lay commenta-
tors. The National Law Journal, echoing a theme of most media ac-
counts, called the decision a "near-deathblow"28 to the Reagan 
Administration's view of affirmative action programs. The Washington 
Post quoted a representative of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights 
Under Law: "All the broad que8tions have now been answered."29 Pro-
fessor Herman Schwartz agreed,30 asserting that "[at least for now] the 
affirmative action wars are over,"31 with most of the conflict's issues "an-
swered in a way favorable to the supporters of race- and gender-con-
23. 480 u.s. 616 (1987). 
24. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). After Croson, the Supreme Court ruled in Martin v. Wil/cs-a case 
argued during the Reagan era-that nonintervening white firefighters could challenge race-con-
scious consent decree provisions. 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2184 (1989). Ostensibly, Martin involves non-
party rights, not the legality of affirmative action. For a discussion of Martin's impact on 
affirmative action, see infra notes 60, 82. 
25. Reske, UPI, Mar. 25, 1987, AM Cycle, Washington News; Savage, High Court Backs Wo-
men in Historic Ruling on Jobs, L.A. Times, Mar. 25, 1987, at AI, col. 5; Vicini, Major High Court 
Ruling Upholds Affirmative Action for Women, Reuters, Mar. 25, 1987, AM Cycle. 
26. Kamen, Supreme Court Upholds Affirmative Action Hiring, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1987, at 
AI, col. 4. 
27. Taylor, Court's Change of Course: New Affirmative Action Ruling Culminates Broad Rejec-
tion of Administration's Stance, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1987, at AI, col. 4. 
28. Coyle, Administration Loses Major Round on Reverse Bias, Nat'! L.J., Apr. 6, 1987, at 5, 
col. I. 
29. Marcus, Many Remedies Now Sanctioned: Decisiou Completes a Cycle of Job Discrimina-
tion Cases, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1987, at AI, col. 5 (quoting Richard T. Seymour). 
30. See Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over but the Shouting, 
86 MICH. L. REV. 524, 524-25 (1987). 
31. Id. at 524. 
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scious action."32 In fact, Schwartz announced that only "inevitable loose 
ends" and "peripheral issues remain[ed]."33 
The 1989 Croson decision indicates that Johnson-spurred reports of 
the death of the Reagan Justice Department position were premature~ In 
Croson the Supreme Court held that a municipal set-aside plan is uncon-
stitutional unless it benefits only members of racial groups arguably dis-
criminated against by the city itself. 34 Although the earlier 
commentators correctly concluded that "the effort to kill affirmative ac-
tion programs has failed,"35 Croson reveals that this failure does not 
mean that affirmative action has prevailed. 
Having miscalculated Johnson's importance, commentators might 
have been more circumspect in their assessment of Croson. Instead, they 
again issued sweeping pronouncements about the opinion's importance.36 
Editorials and columns in the Washington Post, New York Times, and 
Wall Street Journal discussed the "dangers" of Croson,37 characterized 
the decision as "a severe, perhaps fatal blow to local minority set-
aside[s]"38 and "the hardest blow yet against government racial prefer-
ence,"39 concluded that "exacting standards" have now been set for af-
firmative action's "passing constitutional muster,"40 and condemned the 
Court for "drawing a narrower and narrower circle-a noose-around 
any government action that is race-conscious."41 Even Professor 
Schwartz joined this ominous chorus, characterizing Croson as " 'just the 
beginning.' " 42 
The commentators' descriptions of Johnson and Croson suggest that 
· the Supreme Court's affirmative action rulings resemble a swinging pen-
dulum, one day approving of broad affirmative action regardless of past 
discrimination, the next day demanding victim-specific relief. The votes 
32. /d. at 525. 
33. /d. 
34. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 727 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
35. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 576 (emphasis added). 
36. Cf Greenhouse, Signal on Job Rights, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1989, at AI, cols. 4-5 ("In 
declaring unconstitutional the effort by Richmond to increase opportunities for blacks in the con-
struction industry, the Supreme Court did not declare an end to government-sponsored affirmative 
action programs."). 
37. Raspberry, The "Set-Aside" Reversal: Theory over Practice, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1989, at 
A9, coL 1. 
38. Koch, Equal Opportunity-Without Minority Set-Asides, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1989, at 
A19, coL 2. 
39. Gigot, Supreme Court: An Emerging Case of Poetic Justice, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1989, at 
Al4, col. 3. 
40. Setback for Set-Asides, Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 1989, at A22, col. 1. 
41. Krauthammer, Exit Affirmative Action, Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 1989, at A25, coL 5. 
42. Coyle, Reagan Legacy Is Alive and Well at High Court, Nat'! L.J., Feb. 6, 1989, at 5, coL 1 
(quoting Professor Herman Schwartz). 
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of individual Justices provide additional support for this conclusion. Six 
Justices joined in both Johnson and Croson; therefore, Justice Kennedy's 
replacement of Justice Powell cannot explain the swing between the two 
cases. 
The pendulum analogy, however, is also inaccurate. Supreme Court 
decision making is incremental rather than schizophrenic. Conse-
quently, as Justice Jackson cautioned, overgeneralizations make little 
sense.43 Johnson and other so-called broad affirmative action pronounce-
ments are much narrower than the commentators' interpretations of 
them. By the same token, the applicability of Croson is much narrower 
than critics predict. 
This Essay argues that the Supreme Court's recent work in affirma-
tive action is neither far reaching nor clear cut. The argument is divided 
into two parts. Part I considers the Court's 1986 decision in Local No. 
93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland.44 Part 
II, in turn, considers the Court's 1987 decision in Johnson. Parts I and II 
together argue that Local 93 and Johnson are examples of issue avoid-
ance rather than examples of sweeping and definitive pronouncements. 
The configuration of these cases ultimately casts doubt upon the sweep of 
other affirmative action rulings. 
Part III demonstrates that narrow decisions cut both ways. 
Although Local 93 and Johnson are less sweeping than they were por-
trayed by the commentators, Croson does not spell defeat for affirmative 
action programs. The Croson Court's primary objection to the Rich-
mond set aside is its arbitrariness.45 Indeed, Croson suggests that a more 
carefully crafted set-aside plan may pass constitutional muster. 
The questions left undecided by the affirmative action cases, as well 
as the unusual grounds for decision in some of them, suggest that the 
complex issue of affirmative action is far from settled. In fact, the vagar-
ies of these rulings now seem especially important. President Bush's 
commitment to appoint judges " 'who view judging as a matter of inter-
preting the law, ... not making it' " 46 suggests that federal judges may 
narrowly construe Reagan-era affirmative action rulings. This Essay ex-
43. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 13 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (cautioning 
against reliance on "generalized approbations of freedom of speech with which, in the abstract, no 
one will disagree"); Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 65 (1948) (Jackson, J.) ("such generalizations, 
useful enough, perhaps, in solving some problem of a particular case, are not rules of law to be 
applied to all cases, with or without reason"). 
44. 478 U.S. 501 (1986). The Court held in Local 93 that Title VII consent decrees may pro· 
vide relief for minorities who have not been victims of discrimination. /d. at 530. 
45. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 725-26 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
46. Kamen & Marcus, A Chance to Deepen Stamp on Courts, Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 1989, at A 1, 
col. 4 (quoting White House Counsel Boyden Gray). 
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amines how these cases form a mosaic in which the whole is considerably 
less than the sum of its parts. 
I. Local 93: What About Title VII? 
A. The Supreme Court Opinion 
In Local 93 the Court held that a public or private employer may 
develop an affirmative action hiring and promotion plan in settling em-
ployment discrimination lawsuits governed by Title VII.47 Specifically, 
Local 93 validates a court-approved settlement agreement between the 
city of Cleveland and an association of black and Hispanic firefighters.48 
The decree provides that the city must promote minority and nonmi-
nority candidates on an alternating basis to fill sixty-six lieutenant posi-
tions. The decree also specifies that after filling these positions, the city, 
using out-of-turn promotions if necessary, must ensure that twenty-five 
percent of its new lieutenants are members of minority groups. 
The predominantly white firefighters' union49 and the United States 
challenged the decree as inconsistent with section 706(g) of Title VII. 
That section provides that no court order shall extend relief to an indi-
vidual "if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, 
... for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin."50 The union, characterizing a consent 
decree entered and approved by a court as the functional equivalent of a 
court order, claimed that Title VII remedial provisions bar consent de-
crees that benefit nondiscriminatees.51 
The Court, however, did not actually decide whether: the settlement 
agreement was outside the bounds of permissible court-ordered Title VII 
relief. Instead, it ruled that for Title VII purposes, the consent decree 
was identical to a private out-of-court settlement. 52 Although the Court 
recognized that consent decrees possess "the legal force and character of 
judgment[s]"53 and bear the "earmarks ofjudgments,"54 it found disposi-
47. See Local 93, 478 U.S. at 515. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 
48. See Local 93, 478 U.S. at 515. For the procedural history of the case, see id. at 504-15. 
49. The union was allowed to voice its objections to the district court before entry of the decree. 
See id. at 529. 
50. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 259 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982)). 
51. Local 93, 478 U.S. at 514. 
52. /d. at 517-18. 
53. /d. at 518. 
54. /d. at 519. Specifically, (1) a consent decree is entered as a judgment based on a judicial 
finding ofits'propriety, (2) a court maintains continuing jurisdiction over a consent decree and may 
modify its· term~ over signatory objections, and (3) noncompliance with a consent decree is enforcea-
ble by a contempt citation. See id. at 523. See generally Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation 
360 
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tive portions of Title VII's legislative history that emphasize the avoid-
ance of undue federal intervention and the preservation of management 
prerogatives.55 The Court thus concluded that Local 93 was indistin-
guishable from its 1979 decision in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 56 which 
allowed a private employer to voluntarily adopt a race-conscious plan to 
increase minority employment. 
By holding that "the parties' consent animates the legal force of the 
consent decree,"57 the Court further ruled that a decree itself need not be 
in conformity with the underlying statute. Indeed, the Court emphasized 
that a federal court should not refrain from entering a consent decree 
"merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could 
have awarded after a trial."58 
By treating a consent decree as a contract between the signatories, 
the Court left affected third parties, including intervenors by right, with 
virtually no power to challenge the appropriateness of decree provisions. 
The Court asserted that nonconsenting intervenors may raise valid 
claims in a separate action. 59 The Court specified, however, that the pos-
sibility that decree provisions may violate intervenor or nonparty rights 
should not bar a court from entering a settlement agreement. 60 Local 93 
of Consent Decrees in Civil Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 584-89 (explain-
ing the characteristics and purposes of consent decrees); Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bar-
gain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 
887, 929-30 (advocating a systematic procedure to provide fair hearings before entering consent 
decrees). 
55. See Local 93, 478 U.S. at 501-24. 
56. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). For further discussion of Weber, see infra notes 101-05 and accompa-
nying text. 
57. Local 93, 478 U.S. at 525. 
58. /d. Local 93 conceded, however, that a "federal court is more than a 'recorder of con-
tracts.'" /d. (quoting Pacific R.R. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 297 (1880)). Specifically, the Court 
acknowledged that a court could enter and enforce such an agreement only "to the extent that the 
consent decree is not otherwise shown to be unlawful." /d. at 526. This limitation is important with 
respect to contracts with federal executive agencies. See generally Rabkin & Devins, Averting Gov-
emment by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Fed-
eral Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 203, 209-19 (1987) (discussing the constitutional limitations on 
contracts with federal executive agencies). 
59. See Local 93, 478 U.S. at 530. 
60. See id. This feature of the decision is quite controversial. First, as George Rutherglen and 
Daniel Ortiz point out, the union's failure to raise a specific objection to the decree in the district 
court might foreclose its opportunity to bring such an action. See Rutherglen & Ortiz, Affirmative 
Action Under the Constitution and Title VII: From Confusion to Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REV. 
467, 477 (1988). Second, as Douglas Laycock observes: "[A] decree in which A and B agree to 
transfer the arguable rights of Cis not a consent decree unless C also consents." Laycock, Conse11t 
Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103, 
104. For Laycock, "neither violation nor remedy may be adjudicated without notice and hearing for 
the parties to be bound.'' /d. For a contrasting view, see Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of 
Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321, 335-38 (1988) (proposing a method for including third-party 
claims in consent decree proceeding). 
Concerns that Local 93 would foreclose adversely affected nonparty claims have been assuaged 
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therefore speaks only to the authority of a court to enter a consent decree 
without violating Title VII remedial provisions. Although the Court ac-
knowledged that the decree might ultimately be inconsistent either with 
Title VII, 61 or with the fourteenth amendment, the Court considered 
these prospects irrelevant to the disposition of the case.62 
B. The Opinion in Context 
Local 93 says very little about the line separating permissible from 
impermissible affirmative action. By reserving the question of third-
party rights and with it the ultimate legality of the decree, "the Court 
narrowed its holding almost to the vanishing point."63 Indeed, Professor 
Schwartz characterizes Local 93 as "the least controversial [affirmative 
action] decision, for it was the most limited."64 
A comparison of Local 93 to other affirmative action decisions, 
however, makes Schwartz's conclusion less convincing. On the same day 
the Court decided Local93, it ruled in Local28 of the Sheet Metal Work-
ers' International Association v. EEOC65 that court-ordered Title VII re-
lief may extend to nondiscriminatees.66 Sheet Metal Workers' therefore 
suggests that the Court could have held that the Local 93 consent decree 
was within the court's permissible range of remedial authority under Ti-
tle VII. Instead, by basing its holding on the contractual nature of con-
sent decrees, the Local 93 Court took great pains to "emphasize that ... 
nothing we say here is intended to express a view as to the extent of a 
court's [Title VII] remedy power."67 
Local 93's assiduous avoidance of the remedial authority issue is 
troublesome. First, the Court transformed a rather simple case into a 
fairly complex one. The Court needed only point to the remedial author-
by Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989). In holding that an affirmative action settlement entered 
by consent decree is open to challenge by employee groups not parties to the original settlement, the 
Court concluded that any public policy in favor of voluntary affirmative action must give way to 
"our 'deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.'" /d. at 2184 
(quoting 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 4449, 
at 417 (1981)). Moreover, the Court adopted the view of Justice Stevens and defined "adversely 
affected" to include individuals deprived ofvested legal rights as well as individuals denied an oppor-
tunity to compete equally for available job opportunities. See id. at 2188-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Thus, affirmative action plans that guarantee minorities some share of job and promotion opportuni-
ties cannot be insulated from nonparty challenge. 
61. Title VII prohibits "discriminat[ion] ... because of ... race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). 
62. See Local 93, 478 U.S. at 530. The Court also noted that the consent decree might also be 
challenged as a breach of contract. See id. 
63. Rutherglen & Ortiz, supra note 60, at 476. 
64. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 532. 
65. 478 u.s. 421 (1986). 
66. ld. at 482. 
67. Local 93, 478 U.S. at 515 (emphasis added). 
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ity holding of Sheet Metal Workers' to establish the validity of the Local 
93 consent decree. If Title VII remedies may benefit nondiscriminatees, 
it simply does not matter whether a consent decree must conform to the 
underlying statute or whether it is a private contract not subject to Title 
VII strictures. 
Second, Local 93's conclusions that the underlying statute is irrele-
vant and that consent decrees are private contracts conflict with prior 
Court rulings. The 1984 decision Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. 
Stotts68 indicates that "'[t]he District Court's authority to adopt a con-
sent decree comes only from the statute which the decree is intended to 
enforce,' not from the parties' consent to the decree."69 In Stotts, the 
Court concluded that a consent decree must conform to the underlying 
statute, which "necessarily act[s] as a limit" on court authority.7° Conse-
quently, in rejecting the lower court's modification of a consent decree 
that abridged bona fide seniority rights to further the decree's affirmative 
action objectives, the Court noted that neither "the terms of the decree 
[nor] notions of equity" can displace the underlying statute.71 
Stotts' equating of consent decrees with judicial orders is emblematic 
of Supreme Court jurisprudence governing the modification of consent 
decrees. 72 Local 93 does not dispute this interpretation; instead, Local 93 
limits Stotts-and with it the underlying statute-to instances where the 
parties disagree. 73 This distinction, however, ignores language in Stotts 
and other Court rulings indicating that judicial authority "to adopt a 
consent_ decree comes only from the statute."74 
Local 93's conclusion that judicial entry of a consent decree is 
strictly ministerial is, at the least, subject to debate. Why does the Court 
68. 467 u.s. 561 (1984). 
69. /d. at 576 n.9 (quoting Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961)); see also id. 
at 588 n.2 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding "persuasive" the Court's reliance on the statutory 
source of the district court's authority as justification for using Title VII in its analysis). 
70. /d. at 576 n.9. 
71. /d. 
72. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 523 
(1986) (conceding that consent decrees, like judicial orders, may be subject to later modification by 
the court); Columbia Artists Management Inc. v. United States, 381 U.S. 348, 352 (1965) (noting 
that the Court had allowed modifications of consent decrees in the past upon "a showing of changed 
circumstances"). Stotts was extremely controversial for its suggestion that the policy underlying 
Title VII "is to provide make-whole relief only to those who have been actual victims of illegal 
discrimination." Stotts, 467 U.S. at 580 (emphasis added). Sheet Metal Workers' limited this sugges-
tion to the facts of Stotts-non victim relief that disrupts a bona fide seniority plan. See Local 28 of 
the Sheet Metal Workers' lnt'l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 473-74 (1986). 
73. See Local 93, 478 U.S. at 527-28. 
74. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 576 n.9 (emphasis added); see Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 
642, 651 (1961); see also United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932) (holding that "a 
court does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its mandate" regardless of"whether the decree 
has been entered after litigation or by consent"). 
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not simply rely on Sheet Metal Workers' to demonstrate that Title VII 
relief may extend to nondiscriminatees? 
The answer lies in Sheet Metal Workers'. That case involved "long 
continued and egregious racial discrimination" and "foot-dragging resist-
ance"75 to judicial efforts to enjoin blatant intentional discrimination 
against minorities. After twenty years of union nonacquiescence to state 
and federal court orders, which culminated federal contempt citations,76 
the federal court in 1983 established a 29.23 percent minority member-
ship goal. 77 Although this membership goal extended benefits to nondis-
criminatees, a majority of the Justices concluded that "such relief may be 
appropriate where an employer or labor union has engaged in persistent 
or egregious discrimination. "78 In so ruling, the Court explicitly rejected 
Department of Justice efforts to transform Stotts into an absolute prohi-
bition of non victim relief. 79 
Sheet Metal Workers', however, does not define "persistent or egre-
gious discrimination." If restricted to situations as abominable as Sheet 
Metal Workers', the exception to Title VII's policy of favoring victim-
specific relief would be very limited indeed. In Local 93, the Court de-
clined the opportunity to extend Sheet Metal Workers' beyond its facts. 
By emphasizing the nonjudicial character of consent judgments, the 
Court simply concludes that it "need not decide whether this is one of 
those cases" where non victim relief is appropriate. 80 
In the end, although it rejects Reagan Administration efforts to 
75. Sheet Metal Workers', 478 U.S. at 477. 
76. See id. at 427-36. 
77. I d. at 437. For the procedural history of the case, see id. at 427-40. 
78. Jd. at 445. Sheet Metal Workers' was a 4-1-4 plurality opinion. Justice Powell cast the 
decisive vote. He agreed with only this feature of the plurality's reasoning. See id. at 483 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
Because judicial action is state action, judicial imposition of race-conscious relief may need to 
satisfy the demands of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. In addition to this Title VII 
ruling, Sheet Metal Workers' concludes that the union's hiring order satisfied strict scrutiny review. 
The plurality found the remedial order "narrowly tailored to further the Government's compelling 
interest in remedying past discrimination." I d. at 480. The Court employed the identical analysis in 
United States v. Paradise to uphold a lower court order requiring the Alabama State Troopers to 
employ a one-black-for-one-white promotion scheme to remedy "pervasive, systematic, and obsti-
nate discriminatory conduct-" 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987). 
Before a court may order su.ch "affirmative" relief, however, it must find persistent, ongoing 
discrimination. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 408 (1986). In Bazemore, five Justices con-
cluded that present racial imbalance in the face of prior intentional discrimination is an inadequate 
basis to support "affirmative" relief. See id. at 407-09 (White, J., concurring). Consequently, the 
Court did not require North Carolina, which had discontinued its segregated club policy in favor of 
a freedom-of-choice plan twenty years earlier, to remedy racial imbalance in state-supported 4-H and 
homemakers clubs. See id. at 407-08. 
79. See Brief for the United States at 7-11, Local No. 93, Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of 
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (No. 84-1999). 
80. Sheet Metal Workers', 478 U.S. at 515. 
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limit consent decree reliefto victims ofdiscrimination,81 Local93 reveals 
precious little about the scope of permissible affirmative action remedies. 
The Court's responses to third-party challenges based either on Title VII 
or the fourteenth amendment will ultimately define that scope. Because 
the Supreme Court earlier ruled in Weber that employers may volunta-
rily adopt race-conscious hiring plans that favor nondiscriminatees, Lo-
cal 93 does not substantially enhance employer discretion to give 
preferences to nonvictims. 82 Since the opinion rests on a debatable as-
sessment of the legal status of consent judgments, however, Local 93 sug-
gests that the broad remedial relief countenanced in Sheet Metal 
Workers' may be limited to pervasive, egregious discrimination. 
II. Johnson: What About the Constitution? 
A. The Supreme Court Opinion 
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 83 the Supreme Court ruled 
that Title VII does not prohibit public employers from voluntarily adopt-
ing affirmative action plans. Specifically, the Court upheld a plan that 
authorized consideration of the sex and race of qualified applicants for 
openings in traditionally segregated job categories. 84 The Johnson Court 
thus approved Santa Clara County's decision to promote Diane Joyce, a 
well-qualified female applicant, to the position of road dispatcher over 
Paul Johnson, an arguably better qualified male applicant.85 
The Court found Weber to be controlling, despite the fact that, un-
81. See Brief for the United States at 12-20, Local 93 (No. 84-1999). 
82. Local 93's consent decree should not be equated with Weber's voluntary contract. Consent 
decrees, by sharing many of the attributes of judicial orders, enable the entering court to ensure the 
satisfaction of decree objectives. Local93 recognizes these virtues. See Local93, 478 U.S. at 523-24. 
In response to third-party challenges, the Supreme Court may limit consent decrees to what a court 
could order had the case gone to trial. Otherwise, employers will subject themselves both to consent 
decree obligations and to third-party liability. 
This lesson is apparent in Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (I 989). By enabling a broad class of 
nonminorities to challenge consent decree provisions as inconsistent with Title VII or with equal 
protection, Martin forecloses Local 93's prospect of nonreviewability. See supra note 60. Weber's 
approval of voluntary preferences established outside of litigation, therefore, may serve as the outer 
limit of employer discretion. For a discussion of Weber's impact on voluntary preferences in the 
public sector, see infra Part II. 
83. This Essay's analysis of Johnson differs substantially from an analysis I prepared for the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights, where I served as Assistant General Counsel from 1984-
1987. See Williams, Rights Panel Rejects a Statement Assailing High Court Jobs Ruling, N.Y. Times, 
May 16, 1987, at AI, col. 5; Pear, Rights Panel Assails High Court for Sanctioning Job Preferences, 
N.Y. Times, May 14, 1987, at AI, col. I. The statement that allegedly, among other things, criti-
cized Johnson as an unjustifiable extension of Weber represented the views of the agency's Office of 
General Counsel. See Williams, supra; Pear, supra. As this Essay's analysis reveals, I believe that 
Johusou is little more than a reaffirmation of Weber. See infra text accompanying notes 106-27. 
84. See Johnso11, 480 U.S. at 630, 640-42. 
85. See id. at 623-24, 662-64. 
365 
HeinOnline -- 68 Tex. L. Rev.  366 1989-1990
Texas Law Review Vol. 68:353, 1989 
like Weber, Johnson involved a public employer that was subject to con-
stitutional strictures. 86 The Court concluded that since the 
constitutional issue was not previously "raised or addressed," it would 
consider only "the prohibitory scope of Title VII."87 By viewing as dis-
tinct the constitutional and statutory issues, the Court recognized that 
Title VII might countenance conduct otherwise prohibited by the Consti-
tution. 88 The Court, therefore, did not consider analytically relevant its 
1986 decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 89 which set forth 
criteria for constitutional evaluation of affirmative action plans under-
taken by public employers. 9o 
Santa Clara County adopted its affirmative action plan because the 
"mere prohibition of discriminatory practices" was inadequate to correct 
underrepresentation of women and minorities caused by societal discrim-
ination.91 The plan's long-term objective was to make the County Trans-
portation Agency's workforce match the composition by sex and race of 
the county's workforce. 92 The plan therefore represented the county's 
voluntary commitment to equal employment opportunity rather than its 
attempt to remedy the effects of its own discriminatory practices. The 
district court concluded that sex was the "determining factor" in Joyce's 
promotion.93 The Supreme Court majority, however, in concluding that 
the promotion did not violate Title VII, characterized the county's af-
firmative action efforts as "modest."94 Noting that "[a]ny differences in 
86. See id. at 651. Four Justices, however, disagreed with this feature of the majority's ruling. 
See id. at 648-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 664-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices 
Rehnquist and White). 
87. Id. at 620 n.2 
88. For the Court, "[t]he fact that a public employer must also satisfy the Constitution does not 
negate the fact that the statutory prohibition with which that employer must contend was not in-
tended to extend as far as that of the Constitution." Id. at 628 n.6. This statement is counterintui-
tive. As Rutherglen and Ortiz argue: 
[G]overnment preferences for the benefit of minorities should not be closely scruti-
nized because there is no need for the judiciary to protect the majority from itself .... By 
contrast, private employers are more likely to use preferences to avoid liability to individ-
ual victims of discrimination ... [and therefore] may not give much weight to the interests 
of the employees . . . who bear the cost of the preference .... If this is true, voluntary 
preferences under Title VII should be subject to a higher, not a lower, standard of justifica-
tion than voluntary preferences under the Constitution. 
Rutherglen & Ortiz, supra note 60, at 507-08; see also Schwartz, supra note 30, at 540-42 (arguing 
that Title VII requirements must be at least as high as constitutional requirements). 
89. 476 u.s. 267 (1986). 
90. See id. at 273-84. Johnson, however, did indicate that the Wygant criteria would govern a 
constitutional assessment of the plan. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620 n.2. 
91. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620. 
92. See id. at 621. 
93. Id. at 625 (quoting the district court). 
94. I d. at 636. In stark contrast, the dissent viewed the plan as draconian. For the dissent, the 
plan "imposed racial and sexual tailoring that would ... give each protected racial and sexual group 
a governmentally determined 'proper' proportion of each job category." I d. at 660 (Scalia, J., dis-
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qualifications between Johnson and Joyce were minimal, to say the 
least,"95 the majority concluded that the sex of Joyce was "but one of 
numerous factors"96 in the promotion decision. Indeed, the majority 
suggested that the Santa Clara plan was analogous to the sort of race-
conscious behavior allowable under Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke,97 which allows group status to be considered along with 
other criteria.98 Furthermore, the Court noted that the plan applies only 
when the "[a]gency has identified a conspicuous imbalance in job catego-
ries traditionally segregated by race and sex"99 and "it anticipated only 
gradual increases in the representation of minorities and women."!00 
The majority therefore found the plan well within the bounds of 
Weber's acceptable affirmative action. The Court explained that the 
county's plan, like the collective bargaining agreement in Weber, was a 
"voluntary affirmative action plan designed to 'eliminate manifest racial 
imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories.' " 101 The Weber 
Court found this plan unobtrusive in its response to imbalance and there-
fore consistent with Title VII's objective of encouraging voluntary efforts 
to "break down old patterns of ... segregation."102 By Weber's stan-
dards, Johnson is an easy case. 103 The Weber agreement called for a rigid 
senting); see also id. at 658-64 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the structure of the plan and the 
findings at trial). 
95. ld. at 641 n.17. 
96. ld. at 638. 
97. 438 u.s. 265, 316-19 (1978). 
98. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638. In drawing this comparison, the majority did not suggest that 
Bakke should govern the constitutionality of the plan. See id. 
99. ld. at 640. 
100. /d. at 639. Indeed, prior to the Joyce hire, "none of the 238 [skilled craft] positions was 
occupied by a woman." ld. at 636. 
101. Id. at 628 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979)). Commenta-
tors have criticized the Weber opinion for misrepresenting the facts surrounding the collective bar-
gaining agreement. See, e.g., Morris, New Light 011 Racial Affirmative Action, 20 U. CAL DAVIS L. 
REV. 219, 228 (1986) (noting that the employer had engaged in prior discrimination and might have 
forfeited lucrative government contracts without an affirmative action plan); Schatzki, United Steel-
workers of America v. Weber: An Exercise ill Understandable Indecision, 56 WASH. L. REV. 51, 73 
n.56 (1980) (criticizing the Court's failure to mention that if Kaiser had never instituted the affirma-
tive action apprenticeship plan, Weber would "never have been employed as a skilled craftsman"). 
First, the plan was the direct outgrowth of Kaiser Aluminum's failure to meet affirmative action 
obligations of government contractors. Indeed, the Weber district court found that the desire to 
"retain lucrative government contracts" was the impetus behind the Weber plan. Weber v. Kaiser 
Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 226 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Second, rather than responding to imbalances caused by societal dis-
crimination, the plan responded to the union's purposeful discrimination. In fact, the Supreme 
Court noted that "(J1udicial findings of exclusion from crafts on racial grounds are so numerous as to 
make such exclusion a proper subject for judicial notice." Weber, 443 U.S. at 198 n.l. Pointing to 
these factors, the Reagan Administration argued that Weber approved only the remedial use of 
affirmative action. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13-17, Johuson 
(No. 85-1129). 
102. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. 
103. Johnson's insistence that a manifest imbalance be more than a simple comparison of the 
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one-for-one promotion scheme, 104 whereas the Santa Clara plan (as de-
scribed by the Johnson majority) envisions "only gradual increases" in 
minority representation by considering group status as ''but one of nu-
merous factors." 105 
B. The Opinion in Context 
Johnson, although described as "the most sweeping and definitive of 
the Court's affirmative action opinions,"106 is little more than a reaffir-
mation of Weber. In light of Reagan Administration efforts to discredit 
Weber or recast the Weber plan as remedial, 107 that reaffrrmation is sig-
nificant. Yet, by ducking the critical constitutional issue, the Court in 
Johnson did little to extend the existing scope of permissible voluntary 
affirmative action. Indeed, as Professor Schwartz admits, "[i]f the con-
stitutional standards for voluntary plans are significantly more stringent 
than the statutory requirements, affrrmative action hiring and promotion 
plans by many public agencies remain under a constitutional cloud."108 
At first blush, the Court's refusal to extend constitutional norms to 
public-sector Title VII actions is surprising. The majority is surely cor-
rect in recognizing that Title VII is grounded in the commerce clause 
and not in the fourteenth amendment;109 however, as Justice Scalia as-
serts in dissent, "it is most unlikely that Title VII was intended to place 
a lesser restraint on discrimination by public actors than is established by 
the Constitution."llO 
employer's skiiied craft workers with the general labor force, see Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638, is more 
exacting than Weber. See Rutherglen & Ortiz, supra note 60, at 480. Moreover, Johnson's analysis 
of the Weber requirements that white employee interests not be unnecessarily trammeled and that 
the plan be temporary is more thorough than Weber itself. Compare Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638 (ex-
plaining that non-minority rights were not trammeled where an affirmative action plan used sex as a 
consideration, but adding that a specific timetable might be necessary where such a plan employs 
rigid quotas) with Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09 (holding that the interests of white workers were not 
trammeled where the affirmative action plan was temporary and did not mandate the discharge or 
bar the advancement of non-minority workers). 
104. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 223. 
105. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638-39. 
106. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 526. The Administration argued that "Weber was seeking not 
to leave open the door to mere 'societal discrimination' as a justifying ground. Rather, it was seeking 
to solve an altogether different problem: the hardships faced by an employer who wishes to remedy 
his own prior discrimination." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, 
Johnson (No. 85-1129). 
107. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, 12-17, Johnson 
(No. 85-1129). · 
108. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 539-40. 
109. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 627 n.6. 
I 10. I d. at 664 (Sea!ia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, a basic principle of constitutional interpre-
tation is that courts should interpret statutes in such a manner as to avoid invalidating the statute on 
constitutional gr9unds. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) (citing cases in 
which the Court has construed the National Labor Relations Act and related statutes not to permit 
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The legislative history of the 1972 amendment, which extended Title 
VII to state and local governments, also suggests the applicability of con-
stitutional standards. As amendment sponsor Senator Jacob Javits 
remarked: 
[I]t is very important, as we are about to vote on this amend-
ment, ... that we recognize that of all the provisions in this bill, 
this has the most solemn congressional sanction, because it is based 
not on the commerce clause, ... but is based on the 14th amend-
ment. This is a paramount right which is created for all 
Americans. 111 
Indeed, Congress extended Title VII to public actors in response to the 
difficulties state and local employees faced in attempting to vindicate in 
federal court their constitutional right to equal treatment. 112 In other 
words, Congress did not seek to subvert constitutional norms in public-
sector Title VII actions; instead, it intended to protect public-sector em-
ployees' right to equal treatment by providing them with an effective ad-
ministrative forum as well as an administrative champion. 113 
Granted, the amendment's legislative history demonstrates only that 
Congress intended to provide equal employment opportunity for public-
sector employees. It does not foreclose the possibility that Congress 
sought to accomplish this objective solely by extending distinct private-
sector Title VII protections. Such an interpretation, however, is incon-
sistent with the Court's analysis in Weber. 114 In addition, it is unlikely 
practices that would raise serious constitutional questions); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 
(1932) (noting that "it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construc-
tion of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided"). For this 
reason, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), is inapposite. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 n.6. 
Although Dothard recognized congressional intent that "Title VII principles be applied to govern-
mental and private employers alike," Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332, n, 14, in that case constitutional 
standards were less intrusive than Title VII standards. See id. at 334 n.20. Dothard does not contra-
dict the proposition that the Constitution serves as a floor in public-sector cases; instead, Dothard 
establishes only that Title VII may serve as a ceiling higher than the Constitution. See id. 
111. SUBCOMM1ITEE ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 
92D CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 
1972, at 1173 (Comm. Print 1972). 
112. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., lst Sess. 18 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CoNG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2153 ("Although the aggrieved individual may enforce his rights directly in 
the Federal district courts, this remedy ... is frequently an empty promise due to the expense and 
time involved in pursuing a Federal court suit."). 
113. See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., lst Sess. 419-20 (1971) ("[I]t is an injustice to provide 
employees in the private sector with the assistance of an agency of the Federal Government in re-
dressing their grievances while at the same time denying similar assistance to State and local govern-
ment employees."). 
114. In Weber, the Court on at least eleven different occasions maintained that its decision was 
limited to private affirmative action. See Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1565 (5th 
Cir. 1984) (Gee, J., concurring). Weber thus did not merely indicate that public employers' actions 
are subject to separate constitutional attack; instead, by suggesting that its explication of Title VII 
extends only to private employers, Weber implicitly acknowledged that public employers are subject 
to more stringent Title VII review than private employers. See United Steelworkers of America v. 
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that legislation both based in and designed to further fourteenth amend-
ment equal treatment objectives would nonetheless fail to incorporate 
fourteenth amendment standards. 115 Thus, applying Title VII to public 
employers inevitably raises important constitutional issues that the John-
son Court specifically chose to ignore. 
The reason that Johnson eschews the constitutional issue, however, 
is fairly obvious. As the majority noted, the relevant constitutional pre-
cedent is Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 116 a case that does not 
bode well for the constitutionality of the Santa Clara plan. 117 Wygant 
demands that voluntary affirmative action plans be both "narrowly tai-
lored"118 and responsive to actual discrimination, rather than general so-
cietal discrimination. 119 Consequently, although a statistical 
imbalance-even without a finding of intentional discrimination by a 
court or other competent body-is a sufficient basis for a voluntary 
group-conscious affirmative action plan, 120 Wygant's recognition of the 
desirability of voluntary compliance is far from a carte blanche for pub-
lic-sector affirmative action. 
Johnson deviates from Wygant's standards in one critical respect. 
The Johnson plan is based on a statistical imbalance caused by societal 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200, 206 n.6 (1979). For an opposing view, see Schwartz, supra note 30, at 
541-42 (noting that neither the relevant provisions of Title VII nor the legislative history of the 1972 
amendments draws any distinction between public and private employers). 
115. Schwartz does not dispute this conclusion. See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 559. In 
Schwartz's view, however, societal discrimination is an adequate basis for constitutional affirmative 
action. See id. at 553-61. Consequently, Schwartz would ratchet down existing constitutional re-
quirements so that private and public employers alike could respond to statistical imbalance caused 
by societal discrimination. See id. at 542. 
116. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620 n.2 (1987) (referring to Wygant 
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)). 
117. The Johnson Court drew an analogy between the Santa Clara Plan and the Harvard Plan 
that Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-19 (1978), implicitly validated. See 
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638. If applicable in the employment context, Bakke would allow group status 
to be a permissible factor in employment decision making. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18. Bakke, 
however, places great weight on an educational institution's special interest in academic diversity, 
and thus far cour!s have not extended it to other contexts. See id. at 315-17 & n.5l. Johnson's 
endorsement of the Wygant standard supports this limited reading of Bakke. But see Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that Bakke 
might be extended to noneducational settings). 
118. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279-80 & n.6. 
1 I 9. See id. at 274; see also id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reviewing Court doctrine on 
the permissible scope of affirmative action beneficiaries); Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last 
Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80-81 (1986) (criticizing the rule that 
affirmative action is permissible "only as precise penance for the specific sins of racism," as discour-
aging "forward-looking justifications" such as "securing workplace peace" and "eliminating work-
place caste"). 
120. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277 (indicating the necessity of "sufficient evidence to justify the 
conclusion that there has been prior discrimination"). In Justice O'Connor's view, an employer 
would have sufficient evidence "if it can point to a statistical disparity sufficient to support a prima 
facie claim under Title VII." Johnson, 480 U.S. at 649 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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discrimination. The county offered no evidence to refute the district 
court's conclusion that the county had not discriminated against women 
or other minorities. 121 In fact, the majority recognized that the under-
representation of women was caused, in part, by factors unrelated to dis-
crimination. 122 Since the county considered factors unrelated to 
discrimination, a principal purpose of the plan apparently was to advance 
the county's notion of social good. 
Interestingly, Justice O'Connor argued in her Johnson concurrence 
that the Joyce promotion should be viewed as a remedy for apparent past 
discrimination. 123 O'Connor's attempt to reconcile Title VII and consti-
tutional norms suggests that the validity of the Johnson plan did not 
hinge on the separation of Title VII and constitutional standards. The 
failure of any other Justice to subscribe to this theory, however, suggests 
that the Supreme Court takes seriously the line it drew in Wygant sepa-
rating permissible responses to perceived actual discrimination from im-
permissible efforts to correct statistical imbalances caused by societal 
discrimination. 124 
Johnson's failure to address the constitutionality of the Santa Clara 
plan at least puts, in Professor Schwartz's view, a "cloud" over voluntary 
public-sector affirmative action. 125 Furthermore, the Court's characteri-
zation of the Santa Clara plan as more limited than the plan it approved 
in Weber126 suggests that Johnson does not expand the scope of permissi-
ble voluntary affirmative action under Title VII. 127 Although the 
Court's reaffirmation of Weber is significant, Johnson does not break new 
ground. 
121. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 659 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
122. See id. at 622 (noting that among the nondiscriminatory factors were the facts that some 
jobs involved heavy labor and that the number of minorities and women who qualified for positions 
requiring specialized training and experience was limited). 
123. See id. at 652-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's willingness to characterize 
the Santa Clara plan as remedial may become significant in future hiring cases, because O'Connor 
authored the Court's opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (plural-
ity opinion). 
124. Indeed, in a little noticed 1986 summary order, the Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's 
approval of Richmond's set-aside plan for public contracts. C1ty of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 
478 U.S. 1016, 1016 (1986), vacating 779 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Devins, Don't Write Off 
the Reagan Social Agenda, A.B.A. J., Feb. I, 1987, at 42, 44 (noting that the Court in Wygallt 
emphasized "the desirability of voluntary compliance, [by] indicat[ing] that a statistical imbalance-
even without a finding of intentional discrimination 'by a court or other competent body'-is a 
sufficient basis for a voluntary, race-conscious remedial plan"). For further discussion of Croson, see 
infra notes 128-76 and accompanying text. 
125. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 540-41. 
126. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text. As Justice Scalia argued in dissent, the 
majority could have cast the Santa Clara Plan as far-reaching affirmative action. See Johnson, 480 
U.S. at 658-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
127. Indeed, in some respects, Johnson demands a more exacting scrutiny of voluntary affirma-
tive action than Weber. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text. 
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III. Richmond v. Croson: Wygant Redux 
A. The Supreme Court Opinion 
Croson illustrates the full force of Wygant's demands that voluntary 
affirmative action plans be both narrowly tailored and responsive to ac-
tual discrimination. In Croson, the Supreme Court invalidated Rich-
mond's plan to set aside thirty percent of city contracting dollars for. 
black, Hispanic, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut contractors. 128 In its 
analysis, the Court found that the Richmond plan failed both prongs of 
the Wygant test.I29 
Richmond created its plan in the wake of the Supreme Court's 1980 
decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick. 130 In Fullilove, the Court upheld a 
congressional plan setting aside for minority groups ten percent of cer-
tain federal construction grants in response to a legislative finding of so-
cietal discrimination. 131 After Fullilove, many state and local 
governments enacted set-aside plans to benefit minority contractors. 132 
These governments assumed that they were subject to the same standard 
that the Fullilove Court applied to the federal government. 133 
In Croson, however, the Supreme Court concluded that the Fullilove 
model was inapplicable to state and local set asides. 134 First, Fullilove 
reflected " 'appropriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal 
branch,' " 135 and, more fundamentally, the branch that is "'expressly 
charged by the Constitution with competence and authority to enforce 
equal protection guarantees.' " 136 Second, the fourteenth amendment 
"stemmed from a distrust of state legislative enactments based on 
race,'' 137 a factor inapplicable to federal enactments. The Court there-
fore held that state and local set asides were subject to the same constitu-
tional standard as other state and local affirmative action-the Wygant 
standard. 138 
The Croson Court had little difficulty concluding that the thirty per-
cent set aside failed both prongs of the Wygant test. The Court found no 
128. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 730 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
129. See infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text. 
130. 448 u.s. 448 (1980). 
131. Id. at 492. 
132. See Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 454 (1987). 
133. See id. 
134. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 719 (1989) (pluraiity opinion). 
135. Id. at 717 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472). 
136. Id. at 718 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483). 
137. Id. at 720. 
138. See id. at 723; see also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620 ·11.2 (1987) 
(noting that Wygallt sets forth the appropriate standard qf constitutional review in affirmative action 
cases). . 
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actual discrimination because the city did not demonstrate either that its 
contracting dollars were going to discriminatory firms or that there was 
an underutilization of Richmond-area minority contractors and subcon-
tractors.139 The Court considered irrelevant the fact that, although mi-
norities comprised half of Richmond's population, minority businesses 
received less than one percent of prime contracts. 140 It considered 
equally irrelevant the virtual nonexistence of minority contractors in 
state and local contractors' associations. 141 In the Court's view, gross 
statistical disparities are of" 'little probative value'" when special quali-
fications are required to fill particular jobs. 142 The Court reasoned that 
the dearth of minority contractors could be a result of "career and en-
trepreneurial choices" as well as a result of complexities in bidding pro-
cedures and bonding requirements that limit access to the construction 
industry. 143 Prior congressional findings of discrimination in the con-
struction industry and testimony before the city council that Richmond 
was not immune from this discrimination also failed to impress the 
Court. 144 Noting that "[t]he history of racial classifications in this coun-
try suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or executive pro-
nouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection analysis," 145 
the Court concluded that the city council did not meet its obligation to 
come forward with evidence of actual discrimination in Richmond. 146 
139. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 723-28 (plurality opinion). Despite its conclusion that there was 
insufficient evidence of actual discrimination, Croson arguably relaxes the Wygant standard. In Wy-
gant, the plurality "insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit 
involved." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). The Croson decision, how-
ever, indicated that a literalist application of the Wygant criteria was unduly restrictive. See Croson, 
109 S. Ct. at 720. Croson enables a municipality to redress discrimination committed by private 
recipients of public funds. See id. (plurality opinion). Otherwise, the Court noted, cities would be 
unable to respond to some publicly funded discrimination. See id. 
140. See Croson,109 S. Ct. at 724 (plurality opinion). 
141. See id. 
142. See id. at 725 (quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.l3 
(1977)). 
143. Id. at 726. 
144. See id. at 724-25. 
145. Id. at 725. In support of this venerable proposition, the Court cites the Japanese intern-
ment case, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). This citation is doubly ironic. First, 
Korematsu was extraordinarily deferential to the government in its emplacement of a racial classifi-
cation during wartime. SeeP. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 332 (1983) (noting that in Justice Jackson·s 
draft dissent, he suggested that with the adoption of the majority opinion, "we may as well say any 
military order will be constitutional" (emphasis added)). Second, scholars have revealed that perni-
cious discrimination underlay the Japanese internment. See id. at 8 ("The historical background of 
hostility directed at Orientals-first the Chinese and then the Japanese-rode on powerful currents 
of nativism and prejudice," leading to "the replacement of pleas for tolerance with demands for the 
evacuation and internment of this entire racial minority."). 
146. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 723-24 (plurality opinion). As Michael Rosenfeld commented in 
an article otherwise quite critical of Croson: "[B]y borrowing a judicially approved federal formula 
without apparent regard for relevant differences in context, the Richmond City Council opened itself 
up to the charge that its preferential set-asides could not be deemed legitimately remedial even in the 
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Correlatively, the city failed to satisfy Wygant's requirement that 
the means be narrowly tailored because it made no inquiry into whether 
participating minority firms could have suffered from discrimination by 
the city. Because the thirty percent set aside failed to set geographic 
criteria for minority participants and included minorities such as Es-
kimos and Aleuts, who were never victimized in Richmond, the Court 
found that the set aside was "not linked to identified discrimination in 
any way." 147 Indeed, the Court viewed the "random inclusion of racial 
groups" never victimized in Richmond as "suggest[ing]" that the city's 
purpose was "outright racial balancing." 14B 
B. The Opinion in Context 
Many have characterized Croson as the death knell of affirmative 
action. In Charles Krauthammer's words, "the status of affirmative ac-
tion has been clarified. Custer's status was similarly clarified at the Little 
Bighorn." 149 Croson doomsayers point to three features of the majority's 
opinion to support their prediction: (1) a majority of Justices, for the 
first time, explicitly endorsed strict scrutiny review in affirmative action 
cases,l50 (2) the Court limited to federal legislation Fullilove's approval 
of societal discrimination as a basis for affirmative action, 151 and (3) the 
Court extended Wygant through an overly rigid view of what constitutes 
particularized discrimination.152 Despite these protestations, Croson 
does little more than reaffirm Wygant and Fullilove. 
Wygant presaged Croson's endorsement of strict scrutiny. A plural-
ity of Justices held in Wygant that "any racial classification 'must be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest' " 153 and that the means 
chosen must be " 'narrowly tailored.' " 154 Moreover, a majority of the 
Johnson Court referred to Wygant as the governing constitutional stan-
broadest sense of the term." Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond· Affirmative Action and the Elusive 
Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1745 (1989). 
147. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 728 (plurality opinion). The Court also noted that Richmond failed to 
consider either race-neutral alternatives to the set aside or standards that would ensure that minority 
beneficiaries were victims of past discrimination. See id. at 728-29. These concerns, if emphasized in 
future cases, could limit race-conscious relief to actual victims. Croson's reaffirmation of Wygant's 
numerical model, however, and Croson's endorsements of the set aside, speak against this interpreta-
tion. See supra note 139; infra note 166. 
148. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 728 (plurality opinion). 
149. Krauthammer, supra note 41, at A25, col. 5. 
150. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721 (plurality opinion). 
151. See id. at 719-20. 
152. See id. at 723. 
153. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (emphasis added) (quoting Pal-
more v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)). 
154. Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980)). 
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dard and thereby implicitly endorsed this formulation. 155 Of equal sig-
nificance, although the formal endorsement of strict scrutiny is of 
symbolic moment, strict review is not a talisman for the invalidation of 
affirmative action programs. The lead opinions in Bakke, Fullilove, and 
Wygant-the three constitutional affirmative action rulings before 
Croson-all used strict review156 and all concluded that governmental 
actors can redress past discrimination through affirmative action. 157 
Croson is much the same. Borrowing from Wygant, the Croson Court 
recognized that "[w]here there is a significant statistical disparity be-
tween the number of qualified minorit[ies] . . . and the number of such 
contractors actually engaged by the locality," affirmative action is 
appropriate. 158 
This formulation, by using eligible minorities in the relevant labor 
market as the appropriate reference, views affirmative action as properly 
responsive to local ills and not to the problems of a nation. This rejection 
of public employers' attempts to remedy societal discrimination finds ex-
plicit support in Justice Powell's Bakke opinion159 and in the Wygant 
plurality opinion. 16° Fullilove, moreover, does not speak to the contrary. 
As Croson recognizes, Fullilove is very much couched in terms of appro-
priate deference to the exercise of congressional power under section five 
of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. 161 
Croson, finally, is unexceptional in its conclusion that the thirty per-
cent set aside was invalid because it did not respond to particularized 
discrimination. Wygant refuses to recognize mere statistical disparities 
as an adequate basis for affirmative action. 162 Instead, Wygant speaks of 
the need for "convincing evidence ... of prior discrimination"163 and 
cautions that numeric disparities are insufficieut if "unrelated to discrim-
155. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620 n.2 (1987). 
156. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273-74; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980); Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978). 
157. See Wygant, 476 U.S, at 274-76, 280; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 482; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10. 
158. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 729 (1989) (plurality opinion) (em-
phasis added). 
159. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10. 
160. See Wygallt, 476 U.S. at 274. 
161. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 717-18 (plurality opinion) (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472). It is 
noteworthy that, on the day the Court decided Fullilove, it also granted certiorari in a case that 
called into question state authority to remedy societal discrimination through affirmative action. See 
Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 448 U.S. 910 (1980), cert. dismissed, 452 U.S. 105 (1981) 
(dismissing the writ because the trial court had not finally determined the legal status of the chal-
lenged plan in light of the significant developments in the law). Moreover, the Wygant Court char-
acterized Fullilove as a case about the "remedial powers of Congress." Wygallt, 476 U.S. at 272. For 
a prophetic discussion of Fullilove's inapplicability to state and local set asides, see Choper, The 
Constitutionality of Affirmative Action: Views from the Supreme Court, 70 KY. L.J. 1, 9 (1981). 
162. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276. 
163. /d. at 277. 
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ination."164 Affirmative action therefore must be grounded in concrete 
evidence of prior discrimination.165 
In Croson, Richmond failed to produce such evidence. Instead, the 
city built its case around circumstantial evidence-statistical imbalances 
and conclusory statements about discrimination in the local construction 
industry. 166 The apparent paucity of the city's discrimination evidence 
was clear to the Supreme Court even at the time of its Wygant decision. 
Shortly after Wygant, the Court directed the Fourth Circuit to recon-
sider its earlier approval of the Richmond set aside.167 Not surprisingly, 
the Fourth Circuit, in its remand opinion, characterized the city coun-
cil's proceedings leading up to the thirty percent set aside as "betray[ing] 
the very casualness about the use of racial distinctions in public enact-
ments that Wygant warned against."t6s . 
Describing Croson as consistent with the Court's earlier pronounce-
ment in Wygant may seem strange. After all, the. press heralded Wy-
gant's innovation-enabling employers to correct imbalances in the 
164. Id. at 276; see infra note 166. 
165. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277. 
166. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 723 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
The city, moreover, acknowledged that minority underrepresentation might also be caused by such 
nonracial factors as "deficiencies in working capital, inability to meet bonding requirements, unfa-
miliarity with bidding procedures, and disability caused by an inadequate track record." !d. at 724. 
Initially, applying Wygant in the minority set-aside context is troubling. If the city council had 
relied on concrete evidence suggesting that private contractors in Richmond discriminated on the 
basis of race, Wygant's emphasis on the relevant labor market would have constrained the city. 
Because Wygant compares "[minority firm] representation in the public contracting market with 
only the percentage of existing [minority firms] rather than with the representation of minorities in 
the given population," it does not provide a remedy for the possibility that identified discrimination 
has prevented minority firms "from competing with nonminority business and hence from establish-
ing a competitive market share." Note, The Nonperpetuation of Discrimination in Public Con-
tracting: A Justification for State and Local Minority Business Set-Asides After Wygant, 101 HA'RV. 
L. REv. 1797, 1809 (1988). Although it is harsh, this limitation is understandable. Otherwise, af-
firmative action plans-by utilizing minority population ratios-would not be demonstrably respon-
sive to actual discrimination and hence would not satisfy the Supreme Court's remedial demands. A 
host of nonracial factors may influence the underrepresentation of minority contractors. See supra. 
Recent scholarship from unlikely sources bolsters the conclusion that the Wygallt limitation is 
necessary. Drew Days, the Carter Administration official who managed the Fullilove litigation, ex-
pressed strong reservations about the inexpert crafting of many set-aside programs. See Days, supra 
note 132, at 458-59. Indeed, in language strikingly similar to that in Croson, Days argued that set 
asides involving explicit racial classifications should be used only after "lesser alternatives were sys-
tematically and thoroughly explored prior to being rejected" and that "[participation] levels should 
initially correspond to the percentage of minority contractors within the jurisdiction who are quali-
fied and available to participate in government projects." Id. at 483-84. The so-called liberal press 
also attacked set-aside programs. Articles in both The New York Times and New Republic suggested 
that the set-aside programs were riddled with fraud. See Oreskes, The Set-Aside Scam, NEW RE-
PUBLIC, Dec. 24, 1984, at 17, 17-18; Friendly, Road Colltractors Found to Be Evading Anti-Bias Law, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1984, at B4, col. I. These doubts about existing set-aside programs may well 
have influenced the Court. The Croson majority made numerous references to the article by Days. 
See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719, 727, 728 (plurality opinion). 
167. See J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986). 
168. J.A. Croson v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1358 (4th Cir. 1987). 
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relevant labor market through affirmative action-as "a significant vic-
tory for civil rights groups."169 In sharp contrast, the press has charac-
terized Croson as a civil rights debacle. 170 As the earlier case analyses 
suggest, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. 
Wygant's reformulation is a compromise between competing princi-
ples. If it responds to disparities related to discrimination, an affirmative 
action plan can go forward without a contemporaneous finding of dis-
crimination. 171 At the same time, because the relevant labor market is 
the point of comparison, there exists "a strong basis in evidence ... that 
remedial action [is] necessary." 172 
Although Croson emphasizes this narrowing feature of Wygant, it 
explicitly endorses Wygant's compromise. In fact, Croson cites with ap-
proval an Ohio set aside "relying on [the] percentage of minority busi-
nesses in the State compared to [the] percentage of state purchasing 
contracts awarded." 173 In other words, the problem with Richmond's 
plan may not be affirmative action in general or even set asides in partic-
ular, but the sloppiness and arbitrariness of the thirty percent set 
aside. 174 As Joshua Smith, a spokesperson for minority contractors, 
commented, "The ruling itself should have no major impact; the justices 
simply said that a local jurisdiction will have to do its homework."175 
Croson therefore breaks little new ground. Its reaffirmation of Wy-
169. High Court Ruling Signals Support for Affirmative Action, Wash. Post, May 20, 1986, at 
AI, col. 6; see also High Court Bars a Layoff Method Favoring Blacks, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1986, at 
AI, col. 4 (asserting that "the Justices' reasoning [in Wygant] broadly supported some uses of affirm-
ative action by government employers"). 
170. See Frost, Strong Tool Lost in Fight Against Continual Patterns of Excluding Minorities, 
L.A. Times, Feb. 1, 1989, § 2 (Metro), at 7, col 1; supra notes 37-42, 149 and accompanying text. 
171. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267, 289 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 728-29 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(striking down the challenged quota system because it was maintained for administrative conven-
ience rather than for remedying prior discrimination). 
172. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277; see also Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 725 (plurality opinion) (stating that 
"the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be the 
number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task"). 
173. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 725-26 (citing Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 
1983)). 
174. Keip is especially instructive. Like the Richmond Plan, the Ohio set aside was predicated 
upon a determination that state contracting dollars were going to discriminatory private firms. Ohio 
Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 171 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. 
Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967)). Significantly, however, the Ohio set aside-although based on dispari-
ties between the percentage of eligible minority firms and the percentage of minority contracting 
dollars-was far from precise. The set aside allocated a greater percentage of state dollars than the 
percent of minority firms, see id. at 169, 171, but in determining the relevant market share of minor-
ity firms, the Ohio set aside considered only the gross number of minority businesses and paid no 
attention to firm size, see id. at 171. In short, under the Ohio set aside, states and municipalities 
retained fairly broad discretion over their contractor dollars. 
175. Lawrence, Firms Weigh Court Ruling on Set-Asides, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1989. at Fl. col. 
4. 
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gant is important because it crystallizes the standard of review for affirm-
ative action cases. Although this crystallization is of some practical and 
great symbolic importance, it should not be overstated. In fact, by recog-
nizing that a city is empowered to use affirmative action to redress some 
forms of private discrimination within its jurisdiction, Croson loosens 
Wygant's demand that affirmative action respond only to discrimination 
"by the governmental unit involved."176 Although affirmative action 
proponents may find this loosening a thin silver lining in an ominous 
grey cloud, the possible impact of Croson should not be overgeneralized. 
IV. Conclusion: Affirmative Action After Reagan 
The boundaries of permissible affirmative action remain uncertain. 
Commentators who argue that the 1986 and 1987 cases represent sweep-
ing approval of race-conscious hiring and promotion schemes fail to con-
sider how these cases relate to each other; viewed as a mosaic, the cases 
leave unanswered many questions about the scope of permissible affirma-
tive action. In the same way, Croson pundits overstate their claims. 
Croson does not undermine Wygant's promise of expanding the sweep of 
affirmative action. 
The indeterminacy of Reagan-era affirmative action rulings reveals 
some important lessons about Court rulings on highly charged political 
·issues. First, as Justice Jackson suggested in the Steel Seizure case, the 
Court moves incrementally; hence, readers should exercise caution 
before attaching too much importance to any opinion. 177 Second, the 
perceived significance of Supreme Court rulings is defined, in part, by the 
political milieu in which they arise. Although many Presidents seek to 
further their own social policies through litigation,178 the Reagan Justice 
Department encountered a firestorm of criticism because its views on af-
firmative action and other divisive issues were a substantial departure 
from those of its predecessors. Consequently, Supreme Court decisions 
176. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274; see supra note 119 and accompanying text. Compare City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 720 (1989) (plurality opinion) (declaring that in order 
to justify a racial classification, a showing must be made of past discrimination by the specific gov-
ernmental entity making the classification) with Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (explaining that a state or 
local government has the authority to remedy past discrimination in the private sector within that 
government's jurisdiction). 
177. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
178. See J. CALIFANO, A PRESIDENTIAL NATION 168-69, 173-74 (1975); G. EDWARDS & S. 
WAYNE, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 402-03 (1985); cf. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE 
AND POWERS 1787-1984, at 144 (R. Bland, T. Hindson & J. Deltason 5th rev. ed. 1984) (noting the 
President's power to select among the laws to be "faithfully executed" and citing the Sherman Act as 
an example): P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 429 (1988) (noting the Executive's prosecutorial discretion in enforcement of criminal laws). 
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on affirmative action, an issue normally with high stakes, took on added 
symbolic and practical importance. 
Whether the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court will read 
these decisions as narrowly as this Essay urges is another matter. Until 
the courts clarify which path they will take, however, opponents and pro-
ponents of affirmative action must prepare for future battles. 
In many respects, future battles should be less intense. Although 
many questions remain unanswered, Reagan efforts to limit Title VII 
remedies and constitutional relief exclusively to victims of discrimination 
have surely suffered a stinging rebuke. Johnson reaffirmed Weber; 179 
Sheet Metal Workers' refused to extend Stotts; 180 and both Croson and 
Wygant recognize that affirmative action can be predicated on minority 
underrepresentation. 181 Moreover, in several of the 1986 and 1987 cases, 
the Supreme Court ridiculed the Reagan Administration for departing 
from past governmental efforts in support of affirmative action. 182 As a 
result, the Reagan Administration abandoned its initiatives to challenge 
affirmative action hiring and promotion plans in fifty-one 
municipalities. 183 
Over the past few years, moreover, there has been burgeoning sup-
port for affirmative action from private industry and state and local gov-
ernment. Admittedly, this support may be economic. For example, 
some employers "voluntarily" adopt affirmative action plans to stave off 
threatened litigation. This support will nonetheless chill governmental 
efforts to limit nonvictim relief. 
Those concerned with affirmative action, therefore, should attend 
closely to the Court's shifts and signals in its coming terms. The unset-
tled state of the doctrine indicates that significant developments may be 
heralded in ways far more subtle than shouting. 
179. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text. 
180. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text. 
182. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 518 
n.9 (1986) (noting that the EEOC had not joined the brief for the United States); Local 28 of the 
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 444 n.24 (1986) (commenting on the 
"curious position" of the EEOC in challenging the numerical nonwhite membership goals that the 
district court established for the union, because in 1975 the EEOC had asked the court to order 
numerical goals and implement ratios). 
183. Following the Supreme Court's opinion in Stotts, the Administration urged fifty-one juris-
dictions to use Stotts as a mechanism for foregoing their affirmative action obligations. See Affirma-
tive Action Revisions Resisted, Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 1985, at AI, col. 3. 
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